Institutional Power, Collective Acceptance, and Recognition Titus Stahl published in: Ikäheimo, H., Laitinen, A., eds.: Recognition and Social Ontology, Leiden: Brill, 2011. see: http://www.brill.nl/recognition-and-social-ontology All rights reserved. Please do not reproduce or redistribute without permission. ChapterTwelve Institutional Power, CoIIectl¥e Acceptance, and Recognition Titus Stahl I . I n t roduct ion To t h i n k about the inst i tut ional reality of any given society is always also to t h i n k about the relations of power b y w h i c h i t is characterised. Almost al l institutions involve mechanisms w h i c h b r i n g people to both do w h a t they w o u l d not do i n the absence of the inst i t u t i o n and to do w h a t does not always serve their interests. 1 That institutions involve power is thus not a. surprising claim. Raimo Tuomela and Wolfgang Balzer describe social institutions as "a type of collective activity i n w h i c h some forms of sanction or pressure are present/ ' 2 Jon Elster describes institutions as ruleenforcing mechanisms/ and John R. Searle even argues that i t is the point of having inst i tut ional facts i n most cases to confer power onto some entity. 4 Accordingly, inst i tutions involve power b o t h i n their existence and i n terms of their purpose. 350 '• Titus Stahl I t is, however, equally obvious that institutions involve not just " r a w " power, such as mere influence or violence, but a very specific k i n d of authority. This can be shown using Searle's analysis of inst i tutional reality. 5 Searle takes inst i tut ional facts to be created by assigning status functions to objects, actions and persons w h i c h designate certain behaviour as permissible or obl igatory The status of a person being president or the status of paper being money are obvious examples. However, the normative properties created b y these assignments can only be f u l l y understood as being realised i n particular k inds of relationships between agents. Specifically, permissions and obligations can only be socially instituted i f agents are responsible to other agents for their behaviour and, consequently, i f some agents are accepted as entitled to demand compliance w i t h the inst i tutional rules. I t seems appropriate to say that these persons have a specific k i n d of authority. For this reason, ins t i tutions can be analysed as relations of authori ty between agents brought about b y impositions of normative status. 6 I w a n t to take a closer look at this specific k i n d of inst i tut ional power ' or authority. For this purpose, i t w i l l be he lpfu l to concentrate o n social ins t i tutions i n a narrow sense,7 that is, o n those inst i tutional facts w h i c h accompany the creation of stable social status positions of i n d i v i d u a l persons, and w h i c h are inferentially connected to rights and entitlements of these persons. 8 The paradigmatic example of such a system of stable status positions is, of course, the modern nat ion state. Thus, " inst i tut ional p o w e r " w i l l be understood i n the f o l l o w i n g analysis as the power persons acquire through their posit ion i n a stable and integrated system of social rules. 9 2. Institutional and Non-Institutional Power Inst i tutional power is dependent o n the social context and o n intersubjective relations between persons. Therefore, i t is an instance of social power. Whi le power i n general is often defined as the capacity to do what one wants to do,10 social power is the capacity of persons to b r i n g about certain states of affairs b y influencing other people's actions i n a specific way, such as by g i v i n g them institutional Power; Collective Acceptance, and Recognition • 351 certain reasons to act;-be i t by coercive threats, reasoned arguments or anyt h i n g i n between-or b y manipulat ing them into believing that they have such reasons. The not ion of social power, however, is s t i l l insufficiently precise to provide an appropriate description of inst i tutional power, because i t does not capture the specific k i n d of influence o n w h i c h institutions rely. Whi le a bank robber certainly has social power i n vir tue of her capacity to influence the actions of others, her power is not insti tutional i n the sense that i t calls u p o n to ins t i tution-dependent, ontologically subjective reasons.1 1 By contrast, genuine inst i tutional power is a capacity w h i c h has t w o characteristics. First, as an instance of social power, i t is the capacity of a person to bring about certain states of affairs by influencing the actions of other people in terms of giving them reasons to act. Second, this capacity is created through a system of status functions which entitles the person to issue demands upon the actions of others.12 But h o w can the entitlement of a person to issue legitimate demands u p o n others i m p l i e d i n a system of status functions or rules create reasons for these other persons? The fact that such a system of rules normatively obligates a person to per form an action is only a reason for this person to per form that act i f she accepts the relevant system. The reasons inst i tut ional power creates for a person therefore stem f r o m her acceptance of the inst i tut ion, and f r o m the resulting acceptance that the other person can legitimately demand certain actions f r o m her. Therefore, genuine inst i tutional power is distinct f r o m non-inst i tut ional social power i n the way i t influences the behaviour of agents. Because inst i tut ional power rests on (collectively) accepted status functions, i t works-at least i n n o r m a l cases-by g iv ing people a reason to obey the legitimate demands of those w h o have the relevant powers. W h e n someone asserts her inst i tut ional status, the p r i m a r y claim is not that she is able to get other people to do certain things, b u t that she has a legitimate claim or standing to demand obedience. 1 3 H a v i n g this k i n d of power connected to reasons i n this peculiar w a y is specific to inst i tut ional reality. 1 4 352 • Titus Stahl 3. Types of Power within Institutions A plausible theory of inst i tutional power needs not only t o be able to dist inguish between inst i tutional and non-inst i tutional social power, i t also needs to accommodate the different roles of inst i tut ional power i n institutions. Whi le the power i m p l i e d by the posit ion of a person i n a system of collect ive ly accepted status functions is the most important f o r m of power i n institutions, i t does not exhaust the significance of power for inst i tut ional reality. The power relations created by insti tutional statuses certainly account for the everyday importance of institutions, yet one should not overlook another k i n d of powerinvolved i n institutions: namely the power to create, sustain," change or abolish the inst i tut ion and its rules. This could be called the difference between intra-insti tutional and constitutive power. Intra-institutional power, or power within an. inst i tut ion, consists of the power relations w h i c h are created and sustained by inst i tutional rules. Constitutive power, by contrast, is the k i n d of power w h i c h sustains, creates, destroys or changes the inst i tut ional rules themselves. This dist inction between power within, an inst i tut ion and power constitutive of institutions implies that there must be instances of constitutive power w h i c h do not already presuppose institutions, since some constitutive power relations must already be i n place for inst i tut ional relationships to emerge. 1 5 4. Main Features of Institutional Power H a v i n g noted the importance of dist inguishing between inst i tut ional and social power and of accounting for the t w o roles of power i n institutions, w e can n o w approach the question of w h a t the conditions are for institutional power to exist. To answer this social ontological question, i t f i rs t ly has to be noted that such power is not a property of actions or persons, b u t rather a capacity}6 As such, i t does not necessarily have to be exercised: one can have inst i tut ional power w i t h o u t i t having any effects. Secondly, there is a strong and v a l i d i n t u i t i o n that inst i tut ional power cannot be reduced to physical force. I t is of course true that inst i tut ional power is often backed b y physical force. However, the inst i tutional character of such power relies on the fact that physical compulsion is only an exceptional case. Institutional Power; Collective Acceptance, and Recognition • 353 Inst i tutional power i n a strong sense is dependent o n being ( in some w a y ) accepted b y the persons w h o are subject to i t . I t is a k i n d of normative social power w h i c h is distinguished f r o m other types of power insofar as, i n general, its exercise must be legitimised by a system of rules or status functions that the participants accept,1 7 w h i c h is to say, both those w h o are i n a posi t ion to exercise the power and those w h o are subject to i t . We can understand this basic thesis about the acceptance-dependency of ins t i tut ional power i n different ways. Firstly, w e could t h i n k that the n o t i o n of acceptance can be explained as behavioural obedience, such that a person A accepts the power of a person B, i f A consistently behaves i n the w a y B demands. Secondly, w e could understand acceptance as realised b y beliefs about legitimacy, such that A has power over B i f B believes that A may legi t i mately demand that B behaves i n certain ways. But b o t h alternatives t u r n out to be unsatisfactory. " R a w " obedience, i n the sense of the conformity of the overt behaviour of the r u l e d w i t h the demands of the rulers, is neither necessary nor sufficient for the existence of ins t i tut ional power. I t is not necessary because w e can imagine forms of f u l l y and w i d e l y accepted inst i tut ional power w h i c h are systematically disobeyed b y a majori ty for a certain span of t ime, prov ided that there are st i l l organised attempts to enforce these norms and i t is s t i l l accepted that persons are, for example, punishable for not obeying the norms. 1 8 I t is not sufficient, because- as H . L . A . H a r t 1 9 notes i n respect to legal institutions-one can do w h a t another person demands w i t h o u t accepting her demands i f one w o u l d have done the action a n y w a y Genuine acceptance of a demand requires not only that one act i n conformity w i t h the demand, b u t that one do so because i t was made b y a person w i t h the relevant inst i tut ional status. 2 0 Similarly, beliefs are neither necessary nor sufficient: w e can easily imagine that a person m i g h t have inst i tutional power w i t h o u t anyone having explicit beliefs about i t . Conversely, i f a group of people believes that a person has a certain k i n d of inst i tut ional power but none of the members either f o l l o w e d her orders or assumed any accountability for fa i l ing to do so, this empty belief does not make her power real. , Therefore, I suggest a t h i r d option. I n the cases where a person A fails to f o l l o w the commands of a person B, w e w o u l d l ike A to at least accept 354 * Titus Stahl accountability for this failure to be able to speak of an inst i tut ional power relation at al l . This leads to a more plausible candidate for an answer to the question of what "acceptance" means i n the context of inst i tut ional power: to take accountability, or pragmatically speaking, to accept evaluations and sanctions f r o m others. More precisely, i t is necessary and sufficient for B having institutional power over A that i n al l (factual and counterfactual) scenarios i n w h i c h A does not .comply w i t h B's demands, A is ready to accept accountability for fa i l ing to do so. Thus, B has inst i tutional power ( in a narrow sense) over A i f and only i f A is ready to treat B as someone w h o has power i n the respective way, w h i c h is to say, i f A is ready to accept accountability for her compliance or noncompliance w i t h B's demands or, more generally, w i t h the obligations entailed b y B's inst i tutional status. We can validate this i n t u i t i o n b y considering whether there could be any case i n w h i c h people consistently assume accountability for their compliance or non-compliance w i t h the orders of a person and yet where this person could not be said to have any inst i tutional power whatsoever. 2 1 Conversely, w e can also consider whether there could be a case i n w h i c h persons consistently do not accept accountability for fa i l ing to obey the commands of another person and yet this other person could st i l l be said to have some inst i tut ional p o w ers. I h o l d that neither case can be imagined. The element of accountability is thus what separates inst i tutional power f r o m other types of influence. For someone to have inst i tutional power, i t is therefore not sufficient for her to be consistently obeyed or f o l l o w e d ; 2 2 rather, obedience to her must also be supported b y other agents accepting that they are accountable for their compliance or non-compliance. The practical expression of the acceptance of accountability is the acceptance of sanctions.23 People practically take themselves to be accountable for their success i n obeying a specific command i f they accept evaluations of their behaviour w i t h respect to this command, and more specifically, i f they accept sanctions i f they fa i l to obey. A sanction is not merely a reaction to the behaviour of an agent, b u t is a react ion w h i c h is--at least prima facie-apt to motivate the agent to change her Institutional Power; Collective Acceptance, and Recognition • 355 behaviour, 2 4 and w h i c h implies an evaluation of the action according to a certain standard. I n the simplest (negative) cases, sanctions are expressions of disapproval w h i c h , for example, convey this disapproval by negatively affecting the other agent i n a w a y independent of inst i tut ional real i ty But sanctions can also take the f o r m of consequences w h i c h can only be understood i n terms of normative or inst i tutional status such as i n the w i t h d r a w a l of entitlements or i n even the mere expression of disapproval, w h i c h Margaret Gilbert calls " p u n i t i v e c r i t i c i sm/ ' 2 5 They can be, as Brandom puts i t , "norms al l the w a y d o w n / ' 2 6 5. Authority and sanction I f the acceptance of sanctions lies at the core of inst i tut ional power, a p r e l i m i nary analysis of the concept m i g h t look like the f o l l o w i n g : Institutional power (sanctioning account): An agent A has institutional power, that is, power stemming from her status position in an institution, over a set of persons Bv..Bn if and only if (and only to the extent that) (1) the rules which constitute the institution entitle A to make demands on their behaviour and (2) Br. .Bn are ready to accept (sanctioning) evaluations of their behaviour in regard to these rules. We m i g h t n o w say that a person is i n a posit ion of authority i f this person has the status of being al lowed to issue legitimate demands u p o n others accordi n g to the rules of an inst i tut ion and thus has inst i tut ional power to the extent that the inst i tut ion is accepted. But is the person whose authori ty is accepted always identical to the person w h o can exercise the legitimate sanctions constitutive of this authority? Sometimes, an agent's behaviour i n response to a legitimate demand w i l l legit imately be evaluated and sanctioned, i f needed, b y the same person w h o issues the demand. But i n many other instances, this is not the case. Larger groups often delegate the power of evaluation to, for example, agents of a judic ia l system and police. I n such cases, w e can distinguish the power a person or organisation has to make commands f r o m the authori ty w h i c h establishes this power b y enforcing i t through (accepted) sanctions. 356 * Titus Stahl This constitutive authority of sanctioning lies at the very foundat ion of an inst i tut ional order. According to this analysis, the acceptance of inst i tut ional power is constituted b y the acceptance of sanctions. But w h a t behaviour or attitude constitutes a case of "acceptance of sanctions"? 2 7 Whi le explicit beliefs do not seem necessary to accept inst i tutional power for the aforementioned reasons, i t m i g h t st i l l be the case that a subject must have a certain attitude to constitute an acceptance , of power. Intui t ively , the negative case is the clearest one: certain types of reactions show that a person does not accept a sanction. For example, i f a person treats the sanction as an il legitimate attack o n herself, i f she tries to f ight back, or tries to sanction the sanctioner, her reactions clearly demonstrate that the sanction is not accepted. A certain practical reactive attitude-that is , a readiness to react i n the above k i n d of ways-is incompatible w i t h accepting sanctions. Thus, a necessary condit ion for the acceptance of a sanction is at least the absence of reactive attitudes of this type. But this condit ion may seem too strong, since i t is plausible that a sanctioned subject may evaluate their sanction negatively and yet accept i t , just as many people evaluate the fact that they have to pay taxes negatively but s t i l l accept i t . Acceptance should require no more than the absence of an attitude w h i c h leads to a practical challenge of the sanction. According to this idea, an agent accepts the action of another agent i f her reaction does not constitute a contestation, that is, an attempt to punish or negatively sanction the or iginal sanctioner. A n i n d i v i d u a l m i g h t st i l l disagree w i t h a sanction or question its legitimacy w i t h o u t thereby contesting the sanction. N o r w i l l a contestation of an authori ty occur i f a person challenges a sanction w i t h reference to some n o r m that grants an exception-thus demonstrating that she st i l l accepts the u n d e r l y i n g system of norms. Thus, w e can understand an i n d i v i d u a l authori ty relation between t w o persons as further developing what the acceptance of sanctioning authori ty requires. Acceptance of sanctioning authority An agent A accepts an agent B as being entitled to sanction performances according to a specific rule R in a specific context C, if and only if there are no scenarios in which (1) a performance P of A violates R, Institutional Power; Collective Acceptance, and Recognition • 357 (2) P happens in context C, (3) the performance P of A is sanctioned by B referring to R, and in which (4) A is ready to contest this sanction (that is challenges B's sanction without giving any reason that A should be granted an exception). For inst i tut ional power, acceptance is usually thought to be a permanent dis position or habit. Thus, w e m i g h t say that a continually accepted sanctioning authority creates a standard situation of acceptance: Standard sanctioning authority If A habitually accepts the sanctioning authority ofB in regard to a certain rule Rand context C, i. e. is ready not to contest sanctions for any failures to obey R in C in the absence of reasons for exception, we say that A grants B a standard sanctioning authority. I t is n o w only a matter of p u t t i n g the different b u i l d i n g blocks together to . arrive at a first model of i n d i v i d u a l acceptance of inst i tut ional authority: (Individual) acceptance of institutional authority An agent A (individually) accepts the institutional authority of an agent B if and only if A accepts B and/or other agents as having standard sanctioning authority according to a rule R which grants B a status entailing the entitlement to issue demands on As behaviour in a specific context C. This account already fulf i ls some of the conditions w e have set out w i t h regard to a plausible concept of inst i tut ional power as i t does not depend on universal obedience, i t understands power as a capacity, and allows us to dist inguish cases of genuine acceptance of demands f r o m cases of contingent behavioural conformity. Even w i t h o u t f u l l y understanding the specifics of inst i tut ional authority, i t is n o w possible to describe a prel iminary typology of institutions as regards the • dis tr ibut ion of normative authority. The relation " A has authority over B i n regard to a specific n o r m i n specific condit ions" can funct ion as both a symmetric and an asymmetric relation. A symmetric authority relation exists w h e n , according to some status funct ion, an agent has authority over another agent only i f the former grants the latter the exact same authority, whi le an asymmetric authori ty relation exists w h e n an agent has authority over another agent w i t h o u t the latter having the same k i n d of authori ty w i t h respect to that rule and context. A t the collective level, there could be inst i tut ional settings w i t h different kinds of authori ty distributions i n w h i c h different persons w o u l d have 358 * Titus Stahl different types of authority, symmetric or asymmetric, over one another. A n (hypothetical) extreme case w o u l d be the monopolisation of authority, an inst i tut ional setting where a group of agents or even a single agent has authori t y over everyone else, w h i l e everyone else has no authority at a l l . The other extreme w o u l d be an inst i tutional setting where every agent has authority regarding the same rule and context over every other agent, and where there is thus one pervasive and symmetric authori ty distr ibution. We can call this latter case an egalitarian-symmetric distribution of this authority type. 6. The Constitution of Collective Acceptance by Mutual Recognition I n d i v i d u a l acceptance of authority, as analysed so far, is not sufficient for social or insti tutional power, since i n d i v i d u a l agents can independently accept sanctions f r o m one another w i t h o u t thereby creating a social ins t i tut ion. We only call those practices institutions w h i c h are created through the collective acceptance of rules and status-functions. For example, i f al l U.S. citizens decide i n d i v i d u a l l y that they w i l l accept shells as legal tender (and consequently, that they w i l l accept sanctions for not l i v i n g u p to this decision), this w i l l not establish shells as legal tender-if alone for the reason that such a decision is not up to any i n d i v i d u a l . Even i f i t became common knowledge that al l U.S. citizens had i n d i v i d u a l l y decided to accept shells as legal tender, w e w o u l d imagine that for shells to become legal tender i t w o u l d st i l l be necessary that there be a public declaration of some sort, through w h i c h the i n d i v i d u a l intentions become a collectively shared rule. This i n t u i t i o n points to the necessity of not only i n d i v i d u a l b u t also collective acceptance of authority for the construction of f u l l b l o w n institutions, a requirement w h i c h is shared b y the social ontological accounts of Searle, Tuomela and Gilbert . 2 8 I n addi t ion to the issue of descriptive adequacy, there are t w o theoretical reasons to endorse the necessity of collective acceptance. Firstly, inst i tut ional rules have a b i n d i n g force on the part ic ipat ing individuals , that is, they are at least sometimes obliged to fo l low these rules. As Gilbert argues, 2 9 i n d i v i d u a l commitment to a rule is insufficient to explain this obligation as a matter of principle . Secondly, a more general argument concerns whether individuals I . . . Institutional Power; Collective Acceptance, and Recognition • 359 taken as such can fo l low a rule i n a meaningful sense at al l . The rulef o l l o w i n g arguments b y Wittgenstein, Kr ipke and their ' followers suggest that there must be a collective element i n any k i n d of ru le fo l lowing, and consequently that the status functions of institutions w h i c h are constitutive of rules must have a collective character at the most fundamental level. Whether these arguments succeed' or not , i t is reasonable to argue that i f d i f ferences between the collective and merely i n d i v i d u a l acceptance of a n o r m can convincingly be established, then inst i tutional power requires that there is a collectively held n o r m i n a group that the respective sanctions should be accepted. But w h a t difference might there be between a group i n w h i c h every i n d i v i d ual accepts a n o r m privately and a group i n w h i c h a n o r m is collectively accepted? A he lpfu l approach to this problem is offered b y Gilbert's discussion of collective belief. 3 0 O n Gilbert's account, collectively believing a proposit ion entails collectively accepting the proposit ion. 3 1 This collective acceptance of a proposi t ion is accompanied b y a normative obligation to conform to the implications of this acceptance w h i c h take to h o l d between themselves. Therefore, collective belief entails that group members accept that they are entitled to expect each other to conform to the shared commitment to the belief, and that they are even entit led to rebuke group members w h o do not act i n accordance w i t h this commitment . 3 2 I w o u l d l ike to propose that the same condit ion holds for the collective acceptance of an inst i tutional rule (at least i n basic cases). A rule is only genuinely collectively accepted as a shared rule to the extent to w h i c h the members of a group see each other as entitled to demand compliance from each other?3 I t fo l lows that collective acceptance is accompanied b y the inst i tut ion of a specific f o r m of authority. For saying that group members legitimately expect specific behaviour f r o m other members-and can rebuke them i f they do not behave this w a y - i s tantamount to saying that they grant each other a certain authori ty over each other's behaviour. I f w e w a n t to describe the pragmatic significance of collective commitment using the vocabulary already introduced, w e can further extend Gilbert's account b y saying that a group of persons is collectively committed to a certa in rule on ly i f every member of the group has a particular type of accepted 360 Titus Stahl authori ty over the other members, namely the authori ty to demand compli ance w i t h the collective commitment. 3 4 This authori ty is obviously not uncondi t ional , b u t rather depends on whether the other group members actually accept to be part of the collective commitment. But i f this condit ion is f u l filled, then the collective commitment must be understood as sufficient for the relation of authority. Collective commitment consequently does not need to be supplemented b y an addit ional i n d i v i d u a l commitment i n order to create relations of authori ty since-as described-authority is directly entailed b y collective commitment . Consequently, i f group members accept a collective commitment, they must accept the respective authority w i t h o u t requir ing any further justif ication. 3 5 Thus, i f collective acceptance is to be realised i n a social setting persons should at least accept each other (to a socially relevant degree) as being entit led to make the normative judgements w h i c h constitute their authority, for example, crit icism and demands for compliance w i t h norms. Therefore, w e can describe collective acceptance using the same pragmatic vocabulary introduced earlier. Collective acceptance w o u l d then consist i n a (more or less) symmetric case of acceptance of authority in regard to a shared rule?6 A t the most fundamental level this must be even of the egalitarian-symmetric type: A n y agent w h o has a special authority or non-authori ty i n regard to some subject matter cannot have this authority other than b y being, i n t u r n , collectively accepted to have this authority. A n d , unless w e accept an infinite regress, at the bot tom there must be a symmetric case where everyone accepts everyone else's authority, and through the same relation of acceptance i t is collectively agreed that everyone has this specific authority. A t this po int , i t is necessary to remark that the above conceptual analysis does not i m p l y that there is no coercion. As Gilbert argues, one can indeed be coerced into a collective belief w i t h o u t this belief losing its obligating character,3 7 and the same is true for the collective acceptance of author i ty Nevertheless, collective acceptance must also always include a certain degree of m u t u a l authori ty ascription regardless of h o w i t emerges, i n order for collective acceptance to be distinguishable f r o m pure coercion. 3 8 Consequently, there must be both fundamental forms of inst i tut ional reality, w h i c h involve only the basic social status of m u t u a l authority ascription, and Institutional Power; Collective Acceptance, and Recognition • 361 more complicated institutions, where new forms of social status are created through the collective acceptance of rules or procedures according to w h i c h this status is assigned to. persons. Addi t ional ly , as already mentioned above, the collective acceptance of the entitlement of a specific set of persons to sanct ion behaviour can be constitutive of the inst i tut ional status of an entirely d i f ferent set of persons. . N o w , the only element w h i c h seems to resist such a pragmatic solution is the concept of a "shared rule . " Speaking of a shared rule m i g h t seem a mere w a y of ta lking. That is, w h i l e one may accept rules collectively, i t could be said that the w o r k of interpreting and applying these rules i n each particular case must s t i l l be done b y Individuals . However, i f there is no shared standard of application and interpretation, there are only i n d i v i d u a l interpretations of what the rule is. I f the interpretation of a shared rule i n particular cases is nothing more than an interpretation b y indiv iduals , then a collective acceptance account w h i c h rests on the not ion of a shared rule w o u l d effectively amount to noth ing more than an account of the i n d i v i d u a l acceptance of i n d i v i d u a l rule-interpretations. Consequently, there can only be collective acceptance of a system of status-functions i n a strong sense If i t is not just the abstract acceptance of norms that is subject to collective attitudes, b u t also their concrete application and interpretation. Consequently, to avoid collapsing in to i n d i v i d u a l i s m , bo th symmetric and egalitarian relations of authority ascript ion must also be understood as recursive, for the agents i n a group must not only accept each other as authorities i n regard to a specific rule , but as regards the interpretation and.application of this rule according to second-level rules, and so o n . 3 9 Is this requirement too demanding? I t does seem counter-intuitive to ascribe an i n f i n i t y of relations of m u t u a l authority-ascription to the members of a group. However, this is unproblematic i f w e remember that the acceptance of authori ty contains a counterf actual element. To accept the authority of another i n d i v i d u a l o n an inf inite number of questions is tantamount to being ready to treat her reactions i n a certain way. if'one of these questions ever arises. Since the question of authority only arises i n the case of challenges of evaluations, there is no problem, because-given the sufficiency of non-contestation for acceptance-we can just imagine the group members to be committed to accept each other's criticism on every level, w i t h o u t them relating to any level specif ical ly As far as questions of authority at higher levels tend to be decided362 • Titus Stahl according to rules that are more w i d e l y shared, more stable and more tested, w e can imagine that challenges w i l l be progressively less l ike ly on each level. The central c laim n o w is that the not ion of a recursive, symmetric mutual authority ascription is pragmatically equivalent to Gilbert's idea of collective commitment , a l though i t m i g h t be conceptually different. 4 0 I w a n t to. call a constant disposition or readiness to participate i n such a m u t u a l relation of authority ascription ''recognition/' That is, t w o persons recognise each other i n regard to a social relation i f they are ready to take part i n a structure of m u t u a l , symmetric, recursive authori ty ascription i n regard to this relation. The term "recognit ion" is, as is w e l l k n o w n , historically rooted i n the theories of Fichte and Hegel, and i t has also been taken u p recently i n analytic philosophy. 4 1 However, the meaning of this te rm i n the historical context of German Ideal i sm-which is also used b y contemporary social philosophers as Charles Taylor and A x e l Honneth-is distinct f r o m the more technical sense i n w h i c h i t is used here. I n social philosophy, "recognit ion" identifies an attitude towards specific features of persons w h i c h confirms or even constitutes important aspects of their status as persons and their personal identity, and w h i c h thereby acquires mora l significance. 4 2 However, these relations between recognition, subjectivi t y and ident i ty are not central to this analysis. Rather, "recognit ion" i n the sense of a m u t u a l authority ascription focusses o n the capacity of certain att i tudes to constitute forms of social authori ty w h i c h are, i n t u r n , narrowly defined as an acceptance of sanctioning power. Of course, this is not to say that there are no connections to the w i d e r issues of social status i n general or even to the social construction of identities. But whi le these connections w o u l d need to be discussed w i t h i n a general social theory, the specific understanding of "recognit ion" used here is already sufficient to discuss the basic features of inst i tut ional power. I f we accept that the basic element of collective commitment is the readiness for recursive, symmetric acceptance of sanctions, or the relation of recognit i o n w h i c h is constituted b y this readiness, then understanding h o w a group could collectively be committed to a certain n o r m , and h o w a group could collectively accept the authority that goes along w i t h a specific inst i tut ion, is Institutional Power; Collective Acceptance, and Recognition • 363 no longer problematic. I f the members of a specific group ascribe to each other m u t u a l , recursive authori ty about w h i c h sanctions should be accepted b y w h o m and i n w h a t respect, w e can legitimately say that the group collectively accepts these sanctions and thereby fulf i ls the pragmatic conditions of accepting a specific author i ty I f this authori ty is accepted i n respect to an appropr i ate constitutive rule of an inst i tut ional fact, the group accepts and constitutes the inst i tut ional power of the relevant agents. Therefore, a n o r m is collectively accepted i f the members of a group of agents recognise each other's authority i n regard to this n o r m . A n d the inst i tut ional power of an agent is collectively accepted i f there is a collectively accepted status rule w h i c h mandates the acceptance of the respective sanctions b y this agent. Consequently, the basic case of inst i tutional power can be understood as fol lows: Institutional power (recognition account) An agent A has basic institutional power over a set of persons Br.Bn if and only if (a) Br.Bn are part of a group G (which can but does not have to include A), (b) the members ofG display a constant readiness or disposition to grant each other the recursive and symmetric standard authority to evaluate each other's behaviour in regard to a norm or rule R, (c) R prescribes Br.Bn to respect the institutional obligations and entitlements entailed by As institutional status, (d) As institutional status entails that A is entitled to make legitimate demands regarding the behaviour ofBr.Bn. Of course, i n sophisticated systems of status functions not a l l inst i tut ional power w i l l be basic inst i tutional power i n this sense. There w i l l be forms of power w h i c h are derived f r o m the basic forms, for example, i f the authori ty of an agent A is based on the acceptance of the authority of an agent C w h o has legitimately conferred A's authori ty to her. Here, a basic n o r m N m i g h t prescribe the acceptance of C's status w h i c h , i n t u r n , entails A's authori ty as a matter of inst i tut ional logic w i t h o u t there being collective acceptance of a rule directly constituting A's authority. As noted earlier, this analysis does not c laim that al l insti tutional power is as a matter of fact of this ideal type. Persons w i t h insti tutional authority often 364 Titus Stahl exercise' non-inst i tutional power w h e n they sanction people for their behaviour i n a w a y w h i c h is not accepted b y these sanctioned persons. But inst i tutions are only able to exercise non-insti tutional power by relying o n agents w h o act on. behalf of the inst i tut ion because these agents collectively accept the power of the inst i tut ion to make them do so. For example, i f one country invades another, the members of the invader's m i l i t a r y w i l l typical ly be able to force the citizens of the other country to change their behaviour i n various ways and thus exert considerable power u p o n them w h i c h the latter probably w i l l not accept as legitimate. Citizens of the invaded nat ion w i l l often resist commands and sanctions, such that whether the commands are successfully executed depends on r a w power or violence. The same holds for the actions of the state against criminals w h o not only t r y to make exceptions f r o m the law for themselves but w h o do not accept the laws as b i n d i n g for them at al l . But i n b o t h cases, the state relies for the exercise of non-institutional sanctions on agents i n the m i l i t a r y and the police over w h o m i t has proper inst i tut ional power because the latter accept the power of other agents of the state to issue commands, and to sanction them i n the case of disobedience. A plausible picture of inst i tut ional authori ty n o w begins t o emerge. Inst i tut ional authority is constituted through the collective acceptance of power, and this collective acceptance of power is, i n t u r n , constituted by the m u t u a l recursive acceptance of normative authority between the participants i n an inst i tut ion. By accepting other agents as entit led to evaluate their actions, indiv iduals thereby practically accept norms w h i c h accede a certain normative status to either the same interaction partners or other agents. The agents w h o are accepted as having this normative status are thereby entitled to take a range of actions, w h i c h often includes issuing legitimate commands w i t h i n a specific context. The not ion power as a capacity constituted b y -acceptance m i g h t seem unnecessarily passive though, as i t requires noth ing more than the habitual absence of challenges. There is a real danger of speaking of this capacity as something merely hypothetical , as i n the joke "Can y o u play the piano?- I don ' t know. I 've never t r i e d . " Whi le i t is useful to start w i t h as weak a not ion of power as possible, i t is important to note that this not ion does not f u l l y Institutional Power; Collective Acceptance, and Recognition • 365 capture the strong sense of power w h i c h actively structures social reality. Power as a capacity is not only a mere logical possibility but something l ike standing abi l i ty A standing abil i ty differs f r o m a mere logical possibil ity i n that i n the former case pre-existent empirical conditions mean that the f o l l o w i n g holds: for any realistic situation i n w h i c h a challenge could arise, there is a mechanism or other social preconditions such that the power of the relevant agent w i l l be accepted. We could therefore define socially effective ins t i tut ional power as the k i n d of inst i tut ional power that is backed by social structures, dispositions or intentional acts, such as social and psychological enforcement mechanisms on the one hand, and collective phenomena l ike the "group ethos" 4 3 or Gilbert's " jo int commitment" on the other hand. A second qualification to this account must be stressed, w h i c h regards its normative significance. Specifically, even though this account refers to norms i n various ways , i t is important to note that i t is agnostic w i t h regard to the "objective" legitimacy of specific norms and forms of power. The point Is not that inst i tut ional power is only legitimate i f i t is accepted, but that i t is constituted by this acceptance itself. The acceptance constitutive of Institutional power is not something w h i c h can be " a d d e d " to generic power after the fact, so to speak, b u t rather is something w h i c h essentially constitutes the character of inst i tut ional power. Therefore, this account is not a normative account i n the sense that w o u l d be concerned w i t h " legi t imate" or "objectively appropriate" norms. Rather, i t only refers to norms insofar as they are objectively and empirically accepted : i n a specific populat ion, regardless of whether these norms should be accepted on m o r a l or poli t ical grounds. To summarise, this account fulf i ls the conditions set out above: i t can be used to dist inguish between obedience and conformity according to the counterfactual question as to whether the agent w o u l d accept sanctions, and i t does not require universal obedience. There, is also, a basis for a concept of a n o n inst i tut ional f o r m of authority, namely, the authority created by.recognition. Finally, this specific type of authority, w h i c h is the most basic b u i l d i n g block of al l other types, provides the criterion according to w h i c h w e can d is t in guish between constituting and constitutive power. Given the necessary capacities and the r ight circumstances, everyone has the abi l i ty to create a basic type of constituting power, as everyone is able to enter 366 • Titus Stahl in to relations of recognition w i t h other people insofar as al l parties are w i l l i n g to do so. Therefore, there is constitutive power available to an agent provided' that there are other agents w h o are-wil l ing to recognise her i n relation to any specific norms. This k i n d of constitutive power is essentially i n a tensionw i t h violence w h i c h does not require such willingness. However , there are of course more sophisticated types of constitutive power beyond this basic capacity to be a source of normative authority. For example, there are institutions w h i c h confer authority onto specific persons not only i n regard to their specific rights w i t h i n the inst i tut ion and the standing to sanct i o n violations of institutional rules, but also due to i t being collectively accepted that these persons m i g h t create new institutions for themselves and everyone else. The inst i tut ion of government is, of course, the typical example for this, because governments are not only accepted i n conducting their business according to the rule of law, b u t are also collectively accepted as entit led to create, transform and abolish other social institutions. However, these higher-order forms of constitutive power are s t i l l dependent on the existence of institutions and thus on the basic f o r m of constitutive power created b y recognition. 7. Conclusion: Consequences of a Recognition Theoretic Analysis of Institutions If inst i tut ional power is analysed i n these terms, t w o important conclusions can be d r a w n . The first is of methodological significance to the social sciences, w h i l e the second concerns normative issues. I t is easy to see the methodological significance of the recognition model . I n social theory, i t has been argued that power can be studied by looking at conflicts i n a communi ty and analysing w h o " w i n s " these conflicts more often than not . 4 4 That this method is insufficient should be clear f r o m the arguments g iven above. A s insti tutional power is constituted by collective attitudes towards sanctioning power and b y the at tr ibut ion of standard authority to such sanctions, w e should not ask w h o is empirically successful b u t rather w h o has such authori ty i n a group i f w e w a n t to study inst i tutional power. To do this, w e must understand behaviour directed at sanctioning behaviour Institutional Power, Collective Acceptance, and Recognition • 367 as a collective reaction, as, for example, i n reactions to successful and unsuccessful protests either against or i n support of government intervention i n society, to attitudes towards the law, and so on. Social scientists should therefore examine the discourses and interactions w i t h i n groups by w h i c h they negotiate their collective stance towards the legitimacy of specific power relations. The second, normative argument concerns three types of pathologies i n ins t i tuted power w h i c h should be of special interest for social crit icism. Firstly, there are forms of inst i tutional power, such as those related to wealth, where the agents w h o are constrained b y this power are either not aware that i t is inst i tut ional power-that is, power legitimacy of w h i c h they could i n p r i n c i ple deny-or where inst i tutional power interlocks w i t h other forms of power such that a one-sided negation of Its legitimacy w o u l d be prohibi t ively costly for an I n d i v i d u a l . Secondly, the acceptance, of inst i tutional power is often not experienced as a conscious decision b y those w h o display this acceptance, because i t is frequently masked by h i d d e n agenda-setting or deception. People can deceive other people into believing that they are accepting a specific sort of power whi le they, i n fact, accept something very different, especially i f the power structure is so complex that a single i n d i v i d u a l can not comprehend i t i n its entirety Finally, a t h i r d f o r m of pathology is the interference of non-inst i tutional power w i t h Institutional power through either physical coercion or the w i t h ho ld ing of material resources. I n respect to these pathologies, the account of inst i tut ional power developed above does not only provide neutral conceptual tools, b u t also an ideal type of inst i tut ional power w h i c h can serve as a means for comparison. I t al lows to us evaluate h o w non-Institutional power-that is, power w h i c h is not dependent o n collective acceptance-may interfere i n the inst i tutional process i n three dimensions: b y h i d i n g the fact of acceptance, through deception and t h r o u g h direct Interference. This points to Hannah A r e n d f s famous dist inction between violence and power. 4 5 Arendt locates this opposit ion not o n the level of constituted power, b u t rather o n the level of constitutive power. Whi le both , power and violence, 368 * Titus Stahl are forms of a capacity to sanction people and thereby influence their behaviour, violence disregards the level of collective, acceptance and thus ignores the m u t u a l recognition of agents. I n the very concept of institutional power there is an ideal of collective acceptance whichis based on collective recognition. W h i l e violence, or-to p u t i t less dramatically than Arendt-one-sided, non-insti tutional social power, persists alongside inst i tutional power created b y collective acceptance i n v i r tual ly every society, i t is at the same time essentially i n a tension w i t h a social order based on m u t u a l recognition. 4 6 Notes 1 S. Lukes, Power, A Radical View, 2nd edition, Houndmills Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2005. 2 Compare R. Tuomela & W. Balzer, "Collective Acceptance and Collective Social. Notions/ ' in Sy nthese 117,1999, p. 176. 3 Compare J. Elster, Nuts and Bolts for the Social Sciences, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989, p. 147. ' 4 J. Searle, The Construction of Social Reality, London, The Penguin Press, 1995, p. 95 5 Searle, The Construction of Social Reality, pp. 38ff. 6 "The person who possesses money, owns property, or is married has powers, rights, and obligations that he or she would otherwise not have. [..] Institutional facts are always matters of deontic powers." (J. Searle, Freedom and Neurobiology: Reflections on Free Will, Language and Political Power, New York, Columbia University Press, 2007, pp. 92f.); compare also: "all institutional structure are matter of deontic power [..] They are structures of power relationships" (J. Searle, "What is an institution?", in Journal of Institutional Economics, vol. 1, no. 1,2005, pp. lOf.) 7 S. Miller, "Social Institutions," in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ht tp: / /plato. stanford.edu/entries/social-institutions/, 2007, helpfully distinguishes between institutions per se, social institutions and institutions, which are organisations. 8 I understand institutional reality along the lines of Searle, The Construction of Social Reality, but concentrate on a narrower range of institutional phenomena, namely social institutions as organisations. 9 For an argument that there are more aspects to institutional power than the Searlian notion of deontic power can capture, see F. Hindriks, "The Status Account of Corporate Agents," in Concepts of Sharedness, eds. B. Schmid, K. Schulte-Ostermann and N . Psarros, Frankfurt, Ontos, 2008. Institutional Power; Collective Acceptance, and Recognition • 369 1 0 J. Raz, Practical Reason and Norms, London, Hutchinson, 1975, p. 98: 'Tower In all its forms Is related to the possibility of realizing one's wishes." 1 1 Adopting the terminology of Raz, ibid., pp. 98ff., one could say that social power typically operates only on first-order reasons while institutional power also typically involves second-order reasons, I . e. reasons to act or not act on certain first-order reasons. For an analysis of social power, see also W. Detel, Philosophic des Sozialen, Stuttgart, Reclam, 2007, pp. 65,73. 1 2 This obviously narrows the scope of an analysis of institutional power considerably and excludes different kinds of power which are often called "institutional power" in the literature, such as agenda-setting, ideology, and so on. 13 xhere is a striking similarity of institutional power to some forms of what Stephen Darwall calls "second-personal authority" in S. Darwall, The Second-Person Standpoint, Cambridge, M A , Harvard University Press, 2006. 1 4 This is not to suggest that the more general forms of physical or social power have no significance for the institutional realm. 1 5 This does, however, not imply that this basic type of constitutive power is raw power in the sense of sheer physical force. 1 6 Lukes, Power, p. 79. 1 7 Compare J. Raz, The Morality of Freedom, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1986, p. 65 1 8 The parking rules in Frankfurt can serve as an example. They are systematically disobeyed, but enforced by sanctions and thus indisputably existent. Failing institutions still exist. Compare also N . Luhmann, Macht, Stuttgart, Enke, 1988, p. 11. 1 9 H . L. A. Hart, The Concept of Law, 2nd edition, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1994, pp. 51ff. 2 0 Compare D . Bloor, Wittgenstein, Rules and Institutions, London, Routledge, 1997, pp. 27ff. Bloor argues that this shows the institutional character of rule-following in general. 2 1 This does not exclude, however, the possibility of error in the characterisation of this power. A group of isolated U.S. citizens could accept a person as U.S. President in the way described who does not fulfi l the necessary preconditions for that status. But even though they would misapprehend his institutional status, he still would have some kind of institutional power (which would have to be correctly described as being something different) over them, as far as they take themselves to be accountable for conformance to his demands. 2 2 As Searle seems to suggest in Searle, Freedom and Neurobiology, p. 91. 2 3 This is related to the difference between "command" and "counsel" in Th. Hobbes, Leviathan: With Selected Variants from the Latin Edition of 1668, Indianapolis, Hackett, 1994, p. 166. The same distinction is explored by Morriss who takes it to be the difference between "power" and "influence." Compare P Morriss, Power. 370 * Titus Stahl A Philosophical Analysis, Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1987, pp. 8f.; The Idea of acceptance or acquiescence Is similar to theone defended by R. Ladenson, " I n Defense of a Hobbesian Conception of Law," in Philosophy and Public Affairs 9(2), 1980, pp. 134-159. Raz notes, however, that Ladenson's analysis is not one of legitimate power but only of de facto power. Compare Raz, The Morality of Freedom, p.26. 2 4 "The avoidance of sanctions is indispensable for the function of power" (Luhmann, Macht, p. 23, my translation) The existence of an institutional background assumption that the sanction is sufficient for this purpose is a necessary condition for there being power, but it is not necessarily the case that this assumption always proves to be true. 2 5 M . Gilbert, A Theory of Political Obligation: Membership, Commitment, and the Bonds of Society, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 190. 2 6 R. Brandom, Making It Explicit, Cambridge, M A , Harvard University Press, 1994, p. 144. Because of this wide notion of sanctions, I w i l l speak of sanctions and evaluations interchangeably. 2 7 Compare S. Darwall, The Second-Person Standpoint, Cambridge, M A , Harvard University Press, 2006, pp. 116f, and A. Gibbard, Wise Choices, Apt Feelings. A Theory of Normative Judgment, Cambridge, M A , Harvard University Press, 1990, pp. 55ff. 2 8 "the status requires collective intentionality" (Searle, The Construction of Social Reality, p. 114); " A norm-entailing sentences expresses a social institution i n a primary sense in a collective G if and only if the members of G collectively accept s for the use of G, wi th the understanding that collective acceptance for the group entails and is entailed by the correct assertability (or truth) of s from G" (Tuomela & Balzer, "Collective Acceptance and Collective Social Notions," p. 198); The most elaborated account of Tuomela's view is to be found in R. Tuomela, The Philosophy of Sociality,, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007, pp. 182ff.; M . Gilbert, On Social Facts, London, Routledge, 1989. 2 9 Compare Gilbert, A Theory of Political Obligation, pp. 197ff. 3 0 Compare M . Gilbert, "Modelling Collective Belief," in Synthese vol. 73, no. 1,1986, pp. 185-204; M . Gilbert, "More on Collective Belief," in Living Together. Rationality, Sociality and Obligation, Lanham, Rowman and Littlefield, 1996, pp. 339-360. , 3 1 Gilbert, "Modelling Collective Belief," p. 195, although strictly speaking she distinguishes collective belief from a more technical sense of acceptance. Compare M . Gilbert, "Belief and Acceptance as Features of Groups," in ProtoSociology 16, 2002, pp. 35-69. 3 2 Gilbert, "More on Collective Belief," pp. 351f. 3 3 There must be a minimal kind of reference to the institutional norm implicated in this acceptance, because the members must conceive their mutual correction and the acceptance of sanctions as referring to this norm. Institutional Power; Collective Acceptance, and Recognition • 371 3 4 In this spirit, Tuomela remarks about agreements, that they give "a reason for each participant to normatively expect that the other participants w i l l indeed participate" (Tuomela, The Philosophy of Sociality, p. 88), and, consequently a reason to normatively demand cooperation; the same holds for his notion of social commitment in R. Tuomela, The Philosophy of Social Practices: A Collective Acceptance View, Cambridge, UK, Cambridge University Press, 2002, p. 143. 3 5 This also seems to be a consequence of the analysis of a "proper social ought-todo norm" in Tuomela, The Philosophy of Sociality, p. 214. 3 6 Whenever there are members in social groups which are not given any authority in regard to the social norms (e. g. children) this does directly entail that they are not full members of the normative group and that the authority which other members exercise towards them is not fully institutional but partly mere social power (based on psychological, emotional or physical advantages). 3 7 Gilbert, "More on Collective Belief," pp. 351ff. 3 8 Many institutions can be shown not to be based on mutual authority ascription alone, but on a mixture of collective acceptance, individual-rational calculation and coercive social pressure. To the degree in which this is the case, they deviate from pure institutional regulation towards individual adaptation and coercion and are consequently not examples for pure institutional power but for social power in the wider sense. 3 9 At this point I can only point to similar models of rule-following as proposed by Brandom and Haugeland in J. Haugeland, "The Intentionality All-Stars," in Philosophical Perspectives 4,1990, pp. 383-427, and Brandom, Making It Explicit. 4 0 It avoids, however, the objections which have been raised against Gilbert's account of collective beliefs, compare Gilbert, "Belief and Acceptance as Features of Groups." Additional support for the idea of understanding Gilbert's account in terms of the mutual, recursive ascription of authority can be found in her account of Hart's concept of a social rule in her M . Gilbert, "Social Rules. Some Problems for Hart's Account and an Alternative Proposal" in Law and Philosophy 18, 1990, pp. 141-171 where she (a) argues that one of the features of Hart's concept of social rules is that they give "group members a title to exert punitive pressure" (ibid., p. 151) and (b) argues that if her account of collective commitment to a norm is correct, "a l l of Hart's conditions w i l l be satisfied" (ibid., p. 165), allowing the conclusion that the entitlement to exert punitive pressure (authority) is a feature of her account of collective commitment, too. 4 1 For example, R. Brandom, "The Structure of Desire and Recognition," in Philosophy and Social Criticism vol. 33, no. 1,2007, pp. 127-150. (Reprinted above as Chapter Two). 4 2 See H . Ikaheimo, "On the Genus and Species of Recognition," in Inquiry vol. 45, no. 4,2002, pp. 447-462. 372 .• Titus Stahl 4 3 Compare Tuomela, The Philosophy of Sociality, p. 16. 4 4 As the classic account of Dahl suggests. Compare R. Dahl, "The Concept of Power," in Behavioral Science vol. 2, no. 3,1957, pp. 201-215. 4 5 H . Arendt, On Violence, San Diego, Harvest, 1970. 4 6 A n extended version of this paper was presented at the conference "Collective Intentionality V I : Social Change" in Berkeley, California. I would like to thank Martin Saar, Heikki Ikaheimo and Mauro Basaure for comments on earlier versions; Raimo Tuomela and Juliette Gloor for two useful objections; and Arto Laitinen for extensive comments on the final manuscript. Part of the work on this paper was supported by a Macquarie Research Excellence Scholarship.